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Abstract
Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e-mail, and telemarketing
c a l l sn e e db o t hp a r t i e st oe x e r te ﬀort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention
depending on average message beneﬁt, while senders are motivated by proﬁts. Costlier message trans-
mission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent,
or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly
gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.
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Expenditure on advertising in the US amounted to some $245 bn. (in 2003); which constitutes around 2.25%
of GDP.1 Of this, around $49 bn. (19% of the total) was spent on direct mailing. A further $47 bn. was spent
on telephone marketing.2 This spending is just the tip of a much larger economic activity that is facilitated
by this marketing. The Direct Marketing Agency (admittedly not an impartial observer) estimates that
Direct Marketing activity drives 10.3% of GDP. However, nearly half (46%) of the 4m tons of bulk mail
delivered goes unopened to the landﬁll (or recycler). If this unread component could be more eﬃciently
harnessed to generate even a fraction of the revenue the read component generates, then the Information
Age junk mail congestion problem alone could be larger than the more traditional sector road congestion
p r o b l e m( w h i c hi sa r o u n d1 %o fG D P ) .
It is not just bulk mail and telemarketing that suﬀer from congestion. Spam email is a curse on a new
communication technology because a spammer can send 650,000 messages in an hour, at virtually no cost:
spam ﬁlters cause people to lose important messages, or even valid commercial oﬀers that they might have
t a k e nu ph a dt h e yn o tb e e nl o s ti namorass of other propositions.3 Advertisements in general often do not
register their message with the prospective customer. Estimates of the number of advertising messages seen
per day vary from 250 to 5000.4 Nielsen Media Research reports a telephone survey (from 2000) in which
they rang up households before 10 p.m. and then called back after 10 the same evening.5 Under 15% of
respondents could cite an ad from the last ad break in the program they were watching at the time of the
c a l l ,a n dv e r yf e wc i t e dm o r et h a no n e ,e v e na f t e rs u c has h o r td e l a y .
The economics of such unsolicited advertising is characterized by a clutter of messages and the subse-
1These statistics are from Nielsen data at www.tvb.org and the Direct Marketing Association at www.the-dma.org .
2The other main categories for advertising are 25% on TV, 18% in newspapers, 8% on radio, and 6% in yellow pages. Note
that telephone marketing is included in Direct Marketing ﬁgures (together with Direct Mail, it makes up 60% of the total), but
not in Advertising ﬁgures.
3The term spam comes from an early anecdote in the annals of computer geekdom. Someone sent his friends a mes-
sage which contained just the word “spam” (after the Monty Python Flying Circus song) repeated hundreds of times:
www.templetons.com/brad/spamterm.html describes the “origin of the term spam to mean net abuse”. Spam can be around
55% of email, or even rise to 80%: see www.obviously.com/junkmail/ and cobb.com/spam/numbers.html .
4See http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=56750 for discussion: the Consumer Reports Website estimates 247
messages a day.
5Details are available at the CAB website: www.cabletvad-bureau.com
1quent congestion of the consumer’s limited attention span.6 In response, the consumer rations attention
by screening out information — and good goes out with the bad, like a spam ﬁlter that blocks out some
worthwhile messages. This view indicates two externalities at work. Senders of messages trying to get their
messages through the clutter do not account for crowding out other senders: the consumer’s attention can
be construed as a common property resource. Receivers of messages mentally screening out clutter do not
account for lost sender beneﬁts.
Various policy measures and institutions aim to address these problems. Telemarketing (junk telephone
calling) in the US has seen a dramatic decline since the recent advent of the FTC-sponsored Do-Not-Call list.
Ayres and Nalebuﬀ (2003) suggested that receivers could set their own personal access prices. Bill Gates has
suggested an email tax might help for spam: “At perhaps a penny or less per item, e-mail postage wouldn’t
signiﬁcantly dent the pocketbooks of people who send only a few messages a day. Not so for spammers who
mail millions at a time.” Van Alstyne et al. (2004) propose a system whereby the sender must post a bond
that can only be recouped if the receiver likes the message content. However, regarding bulk mail, the lowest
rate charged by the US post oﬃce for bulk mailing is 13.1 cents per item (up from 8.8 cents in 2005), which
is way below the current price of 39 cents for ﬁrst class mail.7
To model the interaction, we consider two groups of economic agents, senders and receivers of messages.
For concreteness here, think of them as ﬁrms and consumers. Firms need to communicate their wares. They
do so by sending messages (bulk mail, etc.) to prospective consumers on the other side of the market.
Sending messages is costly and both sides need to exert eﬀort to arrive at transactions: the ﬁrm must send
a message and the consumer must “examine” it (answer the ’phone, say). In this market interaction, the
number of messages sent depends on expected proﬁt of the marginal sender, which in turn depends on the
number of messages read by the receiver. However, the number of messages the receiver examines depends
on the average quality that the receiver expects. A higher cost to sending messages may increase the number
6Unsolicited advertising includes billboards and radio/television. Classiﬁed ads and ads in specialist magazines may be more
sought after. The distinguishing feature we consider is the crowding of attention. This feature applies to billboards and TV
ads too.
7This lowest rate applies to non-proﬁt organizations. The rate is up to 10.3 cents higher for private ﬁrms. For USPS rate
information, see http://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/ratesandfees.htm
2of messages examined because the expected quality rises.
When the message medium is owned by a proﬁt maximizing entity, consumer attention can be enhanced
by improving the attractiveness of the medium, such as screening interesting movies on TV, and, most
importantly, by restricting the number of messages (advertising breaks on TV, for example: see Anderson and
Coate, 2005, for a description of the business model of advertising-ﬁnanced media). In this two-sided market
context, the coordinating entity is responsible for getting both sides of the market (advertisers and viewers)
on board its “platform” in numbers that maximize its proﬁt. It faces a trade-oﬀ because more advertisers
spoil the experience for the viewers and so reduce the viewer base, but advertisers are willing to pay more for
more viewers. Our paper considers the economics of an open-access platform (the individual’s mailbox, for
example), without the coordinating owner which attracts one side by limiting the other’s access. Without
such rationing, consumer attention is a common property resource for advertisers. The attractiveness of
the platform, and hence the desire for the receiver to“join” (supply attention) is given endogenously by the
expected proﬁle of messages sent. Joining is voluntary, without payment nor price inducement.
It has been recognized for decades that excess information is costly: the term Information Overload was
coined by Toﬄer (1970), although the concept was recognized earlier. Miller (1956) presents evidence of an
“inverse N” relation between information received and decision accuracy, which was later elaborated upon
by Schroeder, Driver, and Streufert (1967). Eppler and Mengis (2004) review the literature on Information
Overload from Organizational Science, Accounting, Marketing, and MIS. Interestingly, while they note that
there are also contributions in Health Care, Psychology, and Mass Communication, there is curiously little
work in economics.8 A striking exception is Van Zandt (2004), and our analysis is complementary to his.
He is interested in targeted recipients of messages (his receivers examine a ﬁxed number of messages) and
his receivers have diﬀerent worth to diﬀerent senders. Therein lies the eﬃciency beneﬁti nh i sm o d e lf r o m
a tax on messages. A small tax may be Pareto-improving because such a tax will cause marginal ﬁrms to
refrain from sending messages to those consumers unlikely to be much interested. Those ﬁrms will gain from
becoming more prominent with consumers from whom they expect larger proﬁts. This matching aspect
8Although Shirman (1996) and Willmore (1999) note that e-mail is excessive because it creates negative externalities.
3does not arise in our main model. Instead, we emphasize the interaction of the sending decisions with the
examination decision. Examination is treated as exogenous in Van Zandt’s model, but endogenous in ours.
Here, both sides of the market exert eﬀort which depends on their anticipation of the other side’s actions.
In this context, we analyze policies that alter transmission costs, or that give property or pricing rights to
receivers, and compare with the monopoly platform model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the behavior of the agents on the
two sides of the potential transaction and derives the building blocks of the equilibrium analysis, namely
the sender transmission function and the receiver examination function. Section 3 puts these together and
compares equilibrium to the optimum. Section 4 examines the crucial role of the receiver surplus in the
equilibrium solution. Section 5 allows for intrinsic nuisance costs and looks at the possibility of receivers
opting out completely (for example, the federal Do Not Call list in the US), the pros and cons of outright
bans, and the ability of personal access pricing to solve the problem. Section 6 addresses the solution chosen
by a monopoly information gatekeeper, relates the current work to the analysis of two-sided markets, and
compares with personal pricing. Section 7 concludes.
2 Congestible information
For a (mutually beneﬁcial) transaction to be consummated, information must be transmitted by a sender,
and the receiver must both process it and react positively (by purchasing an advertised good, say, or joining
a club). Only after these costly eﬀorts from both participants can a successful transaction occur. We analyze
a single receiver and many senders. The surpluses to each party (conditional on a message being processed)
depend only on the sender type, so that there is no “business stealing.” We make this strong assumption
in order to focus clearly on competition among messages for the receiver’s attention in examining them.
Senders’ expected proﬁts diﬀer because they have diﬀerent mark-ups, and/or the probability that the receiver
is interested in buying a product may diﬀer across products. The expected receiver surplus can also be viewed
as the product of the probability of buying (being interested in an advertised product) and the conditional
surplus from buying. Although the surplus split may vary quite widely across products, the commonality
4of the interest probability to both sender and receiver might (loosely) lead one to expect higher proﬁts go
along with higher consumer surplus.
Senders decide whether or not to send a message. The receiver chooses an attention span which is how
many of the messages received to examine. For bulk mail, households decide how many letters to open.
For telemarketing calls, they decide how often to answer the telephone. The receiver’s decision considers
the expected surplus from a message. Congestion arises when the receiver chooses not to examine all the
messages received. Equilibrium is described as the intersection of two curves that represent the behavior of
the two sides of the market.
2.1 Information senders
A sender of type θ ∈ [0,1] gets a proﬁt π(θ) > 0 conditional on its message being examined. We assume
that this expected proﬁt is independent of which other messages are examined. We deﬁne types by ranking
senders from high to low by their conditional expected proﬁts and assume that π(θ) is strictly decreasing
and continuous. Note that θ is the fraction of senders below type θ.
There is a cost, γ ∈ (π(1),π(0)), for sending a message, which will imply that there are always some
active senders and some senders “waiting in the wings” in equilibrium. For the welfare analysis, we treat
this as equal to social cost; and we also treat π (θ) as the gross social beneﬁt on the producer side.9 We
assume that at most one message can be sent by each sender to the receiver.10 The relation between the
number of messages examined, φ, and the number this induces to be sent, N (φ), is the Sender Transmission
Function (STF).
If φ is high enough (if receivers were prepared to examine many messages, and at least as many as
are sent) there is no congestion. The marginal sender type then attains its greatest value, θ
max,w h i c hi s
9Think, for example, of purely informative advertising that tells prospective consumers of the existence of products. The
welfare economics of “persuasive” advertising is more contentious: see the discussion in Bagwell (2006) and in issues of the
RAND journal following Dixit and Norman (1978).
10All senders will transmit only one message if a second message is not proﬁtable for the highest proﬁtt y p e ,θ =0 .I n
terms of the notation below, a ﬁrst message generates proﬁt π (0)
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where n solves π (n)
φ
n = γ. Loosely, each sender transmits only one message as long as senders are quite
homogenous and the transmission cost is close to the average proﬁtl e v e l .
5therefore also equal to the maximal number of senders, nmax. This marginal type is determined from the
break-even condition as π (θ
max)=γ; since all lower sender types transmit, the corresponding number of
senders is nmax = θ
max. This gives the vertical segment in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1. The Sender Transmission Function N (φ).
On the other hand, if φ<n max, then there is congestion. Given that the receiver cannot tell a priori
which messages contain which oﬀers, she examines them at random. The likelihood that any given sent
message is examined is then
φ
n,w h e r en is the number of messages sent. The proﬁtability of sending a
message is π(θ) weighted by this examination probability, and so the marginal sender type, θ







with n = θ
∗ (in the sequel we keep n and θ
∗ distinct, despite this equality, for contextual clarity). This
relation generates the curve in Figure 1 in the congested region (φ<n ) .T h ec h o r df r o mt h eo r i g i nt ot h e
c u r v e( t h er a t i oφ/n) is rising along the curve: only a rise in the examination probability can induce more
messages to be sent. This implies that the STF slopes up.11 A higher transmission cost, γ,m e a n st h a tf e w e r
messages are sent for any given φ, so that the STF moves to the left.
2.2 Receiver attention span
The receiver’s relation between the number of messages sent and the number examined is the Receiver
Examination Function (or REF), denoted Φ(n). Assume the receiver has a strictly convex (and twice
diﬀerentiable) examination cost C (φ). The decision of how many messages to examine, which we call the
receiver’s attention span, is determined from the equality of marginal cost with the marginal beneﬁtf r o m
examining a further message.
We assume that messages are independent: how and whether the receiver responds to any message does
not depend on which other messages are received. This means the only competition between messages is
11In summary, N (φ)=nmax for φ ≥ nmax = π−1 (γ) and for φ<n max its inverse function is given from (1) as φ =
nγ
π(n).
6for the receiver’s attention. Let s(θ) ≥ 0 be the expected surplus enjoyed by the receiver after examining a
message of type θ. Her marginal beneﬁt from opening a message is then just the average expected surplus
over the conﬁguration of messages received, sav = 1
θ∗
R θ∗
0 s(θ)dθ. The receiver may be constrained by the






In the sequel we consider s(θ) constant, increasing or decreasing. A decreasing relation implies that sav
is decreasing with n because receiving more messages means adding those of lower expected value to the
receiver, and so Φ(n) is decreasing when φ<n . An increasing relation implies Φ(n) is increasing. The REF
is illustrated for s(θ)=¯ s constant in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2. Receiver Examination Function Φ(n) when s(θ)=¯ s.
The receiver is eﬀectively supply constrained (she would examine more messages if they were sent) up to
n = C0−1 (¯ s), and beyond that point she will always examine the same number of messages.
3I n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d
3.1 Equilibrium (constant receiver beneﬁts)
Equilibrium is a consistency condition that the agents on each side rationally and correctly anticipate the
actions of the agents on the other side of the market. Thus, an equilibrium will be described by a pair
(φ
e,n e) such that N (φ
e)=ne and Φ(ne)=φ
e. This is simply where the sender transmission function and
receiver examination function intersect.
Suppose s(θ) is constant, so s(θ)=¯ s. There is one equilibrium (apart from the trivial equilibrium at
which no messages are sent and none are examined). Depending on parameter values, either all messages
are examined, or else only some are. An increase in γ has no eﬀect on the receiver examination function, but
it shifts the sender transmission function left. Figure 3 shows, for three transmission costs, γ1 >γ 2 >γ 3,
the sender transmission functions and the corresponding equilibria.
7INSERT FIGURE 3. Equilibrium with constant receiver surplus, ¯ s.
For the highest transmission cost, γ1, so few messages are sent that the receiver examines them all and
would examine even more if they were received. The marginal sender’s decision neglects the positive net
surplus to the receiver, so that total surplus would rise if the value of n increased. This could be achieved
by subsidizing message transmission.
In the second case, with intermediate γ, receivers examine all messages, but would not examine more if
more were sent. Again, the senders wish to send no more even though they are examined with probability
one. This is a knife-edge case deﬁned by
π(θ2)=γ2,n 2 = θ2 = φ
c
2, and C0 (φ
c
2)=sav (θ2) (3)
where in this section sav (θ2)=¯ s. Subsidies on transmission costs decrease total surplus for the reason
above; taxes reduce it for the reason below. Nevertheless, as shown at the end of the section, the allocation
is not ﬁrst-best optimal.
In the third case, with low γ (<γ 2), the receiver examines fewer messages than are sent. Senders
would send more messages if more were examined, and there is message congestion at equilibrium. This
“over-ﬁshing” will be diminished by raising γ: there will be less rent dissipation by senders, and better θ
types will transmit. There is a clear welfare gain here to the “better” senders from eliminating the worse
rivals, so higher proﬁt senders are more likely to get attention. Overall sender beneﬁts may rise even if they
are not compensated with the extra revenues because the senders with the lowest beneﬁts are foreclosed,
rendering the remainder more prominent. The receiver though is unaﬀected because the examination decision
is unchanged.
This discussion is summarized in the following result.
Proposition 1 For high transmission cost, γ>γ 2 as given in (3), all messages sent are examined in
equilibrium and a small subsidy on transmission raises total surplus. For low transmission cost, γ<γ 2,o n l y
a fraction of the messages sent are examined in equilibrium, and a small tax on transmission raises total
surplus.
8This means a tax is indicated if senders are overactive, and a subsidy if they are underactive. Van Zandt
(2004) obtains a welfare-improving tax through a diﬀerent mechanism. He allows targeting of diﬀerent
consumer types. Then a price increase may beneﬁt all senders because low-proﬁt opportunities are crowded
out. This raises the proﬁts of the remaining senders (which now have better prospects for being examined).
A l ls e l l e r s ’p r o ﬁts may rise if diﬀerent senders have high proﬁts with diﬀerent receivers.
3.2 Optimal examination: bored receivers and hyperactive senders
As we show below, the ﬁrst best optimum is unattainable if the equilibrium has congestion (the same rea-
soning applies to the set-up of the next section). This is because the optimum has no congestion. If (higher)
pricing were used to price out congestion (reaching the “elbow” point in Figure 3, at nmax
2 ), transmission
volume would be too low because the receiver examination decision does not account for sender proﬁts. On
the other hand, if the status quo has no congestion, then it may be possible to attain the optimum by
reducing the transmission price and so inducing more messages to be sent (which will be examined as long
as the receiver is not sated).
Formally, since the optimum necessarily has no congestion (and so is at a point on the φ = n locus in



































. This relation underscores the two biases in the congested equilibrium conditions.
In equilibrium, marginal examination cost equals average surplus, and probability-weighted marginal sender











If the equilibrium is congested (STF3 in Figure 3), the marginal cost is zero at the elbow, nmax
2 (=
π−1 (γ3)), and marginal beneﬁt is positive since this point is above STF3. Hence welfare is locally rising
9along the φ = n locus. However, at the point where STF3 crosses the φ = n locus, welfare is locally falling
since there marginal beneﬁt is zero and marginal cost is negative (it is above the REF). Hence the optimum
is on the 45 degree line between nmax
2 and nmax
3 . This allocation can be attained by a tax on senders and a
subsidy to the receiver.
On the other hand, suppose the equilibrium is uncongested and sender constrained in the sense that more
messages would be examined if sent (STF1 in Figure 4). Then the marginal beneﬁt in (5) is zero at nmax
1
(= π−1 (γ1)) but the marginal cost is negative. Conversely, evaluating at nmax
2 (= π−1 (γ2)), the marginal
beneﬁt is negative (a marginal sender would make negative proﬁts), and the marginal cost is zero. In this
case the optimum is on the 45 degree line between nmax
1 and nmax
2 , and a subsidy to senders suﬃces to attain
it. Finally, if γ = γ2, the derivative in (5) is zero at nmax
2 because both marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs
are zero. This means the full optimum is attained, albeit fortuitously. The next Proposition summarizes.




,a n dc a nb e
attained with a tax on senders and a subsidy to the receiver. For γ>γ 2,t h eﬁrst best optimum involves




and can be attained with a subsidy on senders. If γ = γ2, the market equilibrium
is ﬁr s tb e s to p t i m a l .
The economic problem here is that receivers do not account for ﬁrm surplus and so examine too few
messages. At the same time, senders have open access, and do not account for deleterious eﬀects on other
senders. While this suggests that the optimum should have less sent and more examined, it may also be that
more should be both sent and examined. Nonetheless, the direction of the corrective taxes is unambiguous
when there is congestion. It is perhaps diﬃcult to envisage subsidizing message examination since the
receiver could claim to have examined to collect the subsidy. The platform intermediary market organization
(discussed further below for the pricing of access) aﬀords some solutions. Television broadcasters can increase
program quality to raise attention span, and radio disc jockeys can announce prizes to attentive listeners.
103.3 Heterogeneous receivers
Households in some zip codes get more bulk mail than others. They are more attractive to senders because
the households are more likely to buy, or buy more (or they could be more responsive in terms of opening the
mail).12 A simple way to introduce heterogeneity into the model is to let households be diﬀerent sizes (or have
diﬀerent likelihood of purchasing). Write the proﬁto fs e n d e rθ matching with household h, conditional on
the message being examined, as ˜ π(θ,h). The simplest size relation is a separable form ˜ π(θ,h)=a(h)π(θ),
where a(.) is an increasing function and h is an index such that bigger h households are more attractive.
Suppose that households are targeted, meaning that the senders distinguish on the basis of h.L e tt o o
the number of messages examined per household be ¯ φ. Then the volume of messages sent to a household of














a(h).T h e L H S
has the familiar form (1), and the RHS just scales the transmission cost. Thus a larger household means
al o w e re ﬀective transmission cost, and it follows directly from our earlier analysis that larger households
will be more prone to congestion. Figure 3 can therefore be used to illustrate the situation facing diﬀerent
households. STF1 now represents a small household, and STF3 a large one.13
A rise in the transmission price can now be analyzed given our earlier results. There is a decrease in the
social surplus associated to small households that are “supply-constrained” by not getting as much mail as
they would read. Such a household is already underserved as the sender’s calculus disregards the receiver’s
surplus. At the other extreme, there is an increase in the social surplus associated to households that are
already congested, for the reason that higher transmission prices deter the least socially desirable senders.
The optimal transmission price trades oﬀ the numbers of households of each type. It would exceed marginal
12Targeting is more precise than zip code. For example, households are further broken down into whether they are pet-owners,
computer users, whether they have previously given to charities, etc. The current material deals with households which are
ranked by size, which is akin to vertical diﬀerentiation. Targeting across households that diﬀer by relative tastes is akin to
horizontal diﬀerentiation.
13We assume here that the households retain the same examination rate independent of size. This happens if they face the
same examination cost function that is low up to ¯ φ and exorbitant beyond. Otherwise, if the households have the same costs,
smaller ones might examine less due to lower average beneﬁt (which is an extra reason to send them less). On the other hand,
“smaller” households may well have lower examination costs.
11cost if relatively few households are uncongested and their surplus is small. Of course, a transmission price
tailored to household type would be better than one-size-ﬁts-all (similar to the personal price proposed by
Ayres and Nalebuﬀ, 2003, although allowing individuals to choose their own prices will lead to excessive
prices, following the logic below).
The targeting model described above leads to disproportionate overcongestion of the larger households.
There are three types of outcome: recipients receive more messages than they examine, they examine all
messages received, or they receive no messages (although they would examine everything they got if they
got any!)14 The larger households have a higher equilibrium congestion level, while smaller ones may face
no congestion: a welfare improvement would divert message volume from large to small.
4 Receiver eﬀort: variable surpluses
Suppose that s(θ) is decreasing (increasing) so that proﬁts and consumer surpluses are positively (negatively)
related.
4.1 Decreasing receiver surplus
Since proﬁts and receiver surpluses are only earned when receivers are interested in taking up the oﬀers,
decreasing surplus is more likely when conditional surpluses are aligned. In this case, the average beneﬁt
(sav)d e c r e a s e sw i t hθ
∗. An interior solution to the receiver’s problem is given by sav (θ
∗)=C0(φ).C o n s i d e r
the Receiver Examination Function, starting with high n.A s n falls, θ
∗ falls, and so φ rises. With a low
enough number of messages sent, the constraint φ = n is reached. Thereafter, a lower n (lower θ
∗)l e a d st o
a smaller φ. Thus (reading from right to left), the receiver’s choice relation traces out an increasing curve
until the constraint φ = n is attained, and then it follows a declining path with φ = n (see Figure 4). The
kink point is for γ2 deﬁned by (3).
INSERT FIGURE 4. Equilibrium with decreasing receiver surplus.
14A similar situation occurs for referee reports: some only respond to some requests, others do all they are asked, and some
would do them but are never asked.
12The interesting feature of this case is the beneﬁcial eﬀects of a small tax, τ,o nt r a n s m i s s i o nw h e nt h e r e
is congestion. Then, the number of messages examined rises because a higher transmission price crowds out
senders with higher θ. This raises the average surplus from examination, causing the receiver to examine
more messages. The receiver is clearly better oﬀ (by the envelope theorem) given that sav has risen. Not
all senders are better oﬀ since the marginal ones are now crowded out, but aggregate sender surplus may go
up or down.15 However, the sum of sender surplus plus tax revenue must rise. To see this, ﬁrst note that














. As noted above, φ rises with τ,a n dt h i se ﬀect alone improves
























dθ which is indeed negative since π(θ) is decreasing. The next Proposition sum-
marizes.
Proposition 3 Suppose that receiver surplus, s(θ),i sd e c r e a s i n g .F o rγ>γ 2 (given by (3)) all messages
sent are examined. For γ<γ 2, only a fraction of the messages sent are examined and a small tax on
transmission causes fewer messages to be sent and more to be examined. This raises both receiver welfare
and the sum of sender surplus plus tax revenue. It thus raises total welfare.
This Proposition highlights the possibility of an extra social beneﬁt ensuing a transmission price rise by
crowding out less attractive messages. The price rise thus leads to higher examination rates.16 The higher
examination rate somewhat curtails the reduction in transmission, but not so much as to overturn the initial
reduced transmission.
Consider now the socially optimal choice of intermediary price. A higher γ moves the STF left and
leads to a socially better selection of messages (the higher proﬁt ones). Hence, welfare rises by pricing out
15Aggregate sender surplus will go up if surplus is very high for low θ types and low for the marginal θ types. Eliminating
some of the latter improve the chances of the former and they get more proﬁt despite a higher transmission price.
16A similar ﬁnding (though in the opposite direction) arises in Engers and Gans (1998): paying referees is not as eﬀective as
might be thought since referees may be more likely to refuse knowing that other referees are induced by payments.
13congestion. This is a fortiori true when s0 (θ) < 0 since receivers also beneﬁt from a better selection induced
from better senders (and they respond with an improved examination rate). Indeed, as long as the free-access
equilibrium has congestion, the (second-best) optimum price is at the REF kink in Figure 4, i.e., at γ2.A s
was also true for the case of constant s(θ), the full optimum though has a higher examination rate.
4.2 Increasing receiver surplus
This case leads to an upward-sloping receiver examination function. Such an upward-sloping relation allows
for multiple equilibria, as the following Proposition illustrates.
Proposition 4 Let s(θ)=0for θ ∈ [0,1/2] and s(θ)=1for θ ∈ (1/2,1] with C (φ)=
φ2
2 ,a n dl e t
π(θ)=k[1 − θ] with k>0. Then there exists an equilibrium with n = φ =0 .F o rγ/k > 1/8 this is the
unique equilibrium; for γ/k < 1/8 there are two other equilibria. The latter are both congested.
More generally, the receiver examination function may join the constraint, φ ≤ n a n dl e a v ei t ,t h e nj o i n
it again, etc. Figure 5 illustrates four such equilibria. The Figure is drawn with a positive vertical intercept
for the REF. This arises if C0 (0) <s (0), meaning the receiver is interested if only the top proﬁt sender
were active. If instead C0 (0) >s(0), the REF hugs the horizontal axis until a suﬃcient number of senders
transmit that the average surplus is high enough to make it worthwhile to start examining messages.
INSERT FIGURE 5. Equilibria with increasing receiver surplus.
The stable equilibria are the two where the REF cuts the STF from above. The zero-equilibrium in the
Figure is unstable (true whenever the REF meets the STF from above), and the one at (φ
c,n max) is stable.17
A low equilibrium level of transmission is sustained when the receiver rationally anticipates a low average
surplus from the highest proﬁt sender types. The receiver examines few messages, inducing few senders
to transmit. A higher level of transmission can be sustained when the receiver examines many messages
in rational anticipation of high numbers sent, and thence high average surplus. Senders respond to high
examination with high transmission.
17This logic also implies that the no examination/no send equilibrium is unstable for the constant and increasing sender
beneﬁts cases.
14Consider the (stable) second equilibrium in Figure 5. For a small rise in the transmission price, γ,t h e
STF moves left and this equilibrium moves down the REF. A higher transmission price causes fewer messages
to be sent, and this in turn leads to lower expected receiver surplus, causing even fewer messages to be sent.
Hence, at any stable equilibrium, an increase in γ causes both examination and transmission to fall. This is
a vicious circle for the receiver. Indeed, for high enough γ, the top two equilibria disappear: the market can
c o l l a p s ed o w nt oam u c hl o w e rl e v e lo ft r a n s m i s s i o n( a n de x a m i n a t i o n ) .Al o w e rt r a n s m i s s i o nr a t em a ya l s o
have drastic consequences: the middle two equilibria disappear and the message volume may jump up.
Decreasing receiver beneﬁts may entail that the only equilibrium has no messages at all. This happens
i ft h eR E Fl i e se v e r y w h e r eb e l o wt h eS T F ,a so c c u r si nP r o p o s i t i o n4a b o v e .
Equilibria with higher levels of messages involve higher φ/n, from the properties of the STF. Active
senders are better oﬀ when they have a better chance of examination. Higher sender numbers also behoove
the receiver because the average expected surplus (sav) is higher. Hence, multiple equilibria are possible
when receiver surplus, s(θ), is increasing and equilibria with higher levels of messages transmitted are Pareto
superior. The equilibrium with the highest level of transmission is an obvious candidate for selection by dint
of it being Pareto superior.18
The example of the next sub-section shows that the market may be closed down when it ought optimally
to be functioning. It also emphasizes a further property of the example in Proposition 4, that the market
solution can involve one set of messages while the optimum involves another set (in Proposition 4, the market
outcome entails the low-θ messages while the social optimum may value more highly the high-θ ones).
4.3 Gresham’s law of junk mail
When proﬁts are negatively related with social surplus the wrong products may be emphasized because the
market sorts out senders on the basis of proﬁts. To illustrate, suppose that there are two diﬀerent classes of
products. Let πi denote the sender beneﬁto fe a c hp r o d u c ti nc l a s si,and similarly let si denote the receiver
beneﬁt i =1 ,2.W ea s s u m et h a tπ1 >π 2 and s1 <s 2, so that the ﬁrst class has higher sender beneﬁta n d
18The coordination problem is essentially on the side of the senders insofar as the receiver does examine sequentially in practice
— and would therefore discover the average quality of messages. Sequential search makes no diﬀerence (to the equilibria) because
each sender is too small to inﬂuence the average quality.
15lower receiver beneﬁt than the second class. There is a large enough number of independent products in
each class. In equilibrium, only the high-proﬁt senders survive, if any: low-proﬁt senders are driven out of
the market since a high-proﬁt sender has a bigger incentive to send a message (advertise). Put another way,
if the high-proﬁt senders are earning zero expected proﬁts from sending messages, then the low-proﬁto n e s
cannot enter the market given that the consumer chooses at random which messages to examine. However,
the optimum arrangement will have only the low-proﬁts e n d e r sa c t i v ei fπ2+s2 >π 1+s1. In equilibrium, the
low-proﬁt senders are chased from the market by the others, even though the social surplus associated with
them is higher. The equilibrium then has the “wrong” message types sent as long as C0 (0) <s 1 (meaning
that at least some messages will be examined).
This is reminiscent of Gresham’s law - bad junk mail crowds out good. The receiver would examine more
messages if she got more of the low-proﬁt ones, but she does not rationally expect to get them. An extreme
form of this phenomenon arises when the receiver surplus on the high-proﬁt messages is below marginal
examination cost, i.e., C0 (0) ≥ s1. Then the only equilibrium has no messages sent - the high-proﬁto n e s
would crowd out all others, and the market unravels completely because no receiver ﬁnds it worthwhile to
examine any messages. This is the “lemons” problem of e-mail - some people have closed their accounts
because of the preponderance of spam.19 This suggests that the market failure is likely greater the bigger
the inverse relation: few messages are examined but more “worst” ones are trying to get through.
5D o - N o t - C a l l
5.1 Pas de publicité s.v.p., and the Federal Do-Not-Call List
Some Belgians and Frenchmen have a little sign on their letterboxes saying they do not want advertising
ﬂy e r s .I nt h eU S ,t h eD oN o tC a l lL i s ti sas u c c e s s f u li n i t i ative orchestrated by the Federal Trade Commission
that allows people to choose not to receive calls from telemarketers. If there is a nuisance cost to receiving
the messages, the receiver may refuse to accept them.
Let S∗ denote the equilibrium value of expected receiver surplus from examining messages, and let C∗
1916% of email address changes have been ascribed to excessive spam (htpp://spam-ﬁlter-review.toptenreviews.com/spam-
statistics.html).
16denote the corresponding examination cost. Assume that receiving each message has a constant annoyance
cost, ω. The surplus and examination cost are independent of the nuisance cost, which is sunk if receivers
intrinsically dislike receiving messages (telemarketing calls especially). Then the private beneﬁt while re-
ceiving messages is S∗ − C∗ − nω.T h i sb e n e ﬁt is to be compared to the zero beneﬁt the receiver gets by
opting out. The zero here reﬂects the surplus from no message transmission: the basic message medium has
a positive beneﬁt that is netted out on both sides of any comparison. We suppose that the receiver does not
close down the message medium entirely (in the status quo of no restrictions and free access). She does not
disconnect her telephone to block out telemarketers, nor close her e-mail account to stop spam.
Suppose that ω i sd i s t r i b u t e di nt h er e c e i v e rp o p u l a t i o n( w h i c hh a su n i tm a s s )w i t hs u p p o r t[ω, ¯ ω] with
distribution G(ω),s ot h a td i ﬀerent individuals face diﬀerent annoyance costs, but are otherwise identical.





The social beneﬁt associated to a receiver with nuisance cost ω accepting messages is
Π∗ − nγ + S∗ − C∗ − nω,
where Π∗ is the equilibrium value of expected sender surplus. A blanket ban is preferred to allowing the
nuisance if




so that the social perspective need not prescribe a blanket ban. Allowing individuals to opt out is better
than a total ban if




where G(ˆ ω) is the fraction of receivers opting in. This is necessarily positive since S∗ − C∗ − nω must be
positive for all those opting in (by revealed preference) and also Π∗ >n γ , which also holds by revealed
preference because senders only transmit when they get non-negative net beneﬁts.
Conversely, allowing opt-out from a status quo of no opt-out improves welfare if Boo >B A,w h i c h
condition is given in the next Proposition.
17Proposition 5 Allowing opt-out is socially preferable to banning messages entirely. Opt-out is strictly better
than allowing free access if and only if [Π∗ − nγ + S∗ − C∗][1− G(ˆ ω)] <n
R ¯ ω
ˆ ω ωdG(ω).
This condition may or may not hold. For example, if ˆ ω is close to ¯ ω then nearly all individuals opt
out, but if Π∗ − nγ is large, allowing opt-out is socially disadvantageous. The reason is that “too many”
individuals opt out: the optimal opt-out cut-oﬀ for ω is below the privately-chosen one. This is because
the individual does not account for the proﬁt of senders at the margin. The ﬁrst part of the Proposition
follows because opting improves welfare by letting in information when both receiver and senders eﬀectively
agree; the second part depends simply on whether surplus is greater with or without messages, given that
the receiver side achieves a negative total beneﬁt at the status quo of receiving all that senders wish to
transmit.20
5.2 Want to call me? Pay me
Ayres and Nalebuﬀ (2003) have suggested individual receivers could set their own personal prices to be
contacted. This price would reﬂect the individual’s cost of time and nuisance. Opt-out is equivalent to an
inﬁnite price and staying in is like a zero price. For those individuals who choose to opt out under an all-or-
nothing scheme, allowing them to choose a price at which they can be contacted cannot make either them or
senders worse oﬀ, and will make senders better oﬀ whenever the price induces some message transmission.
The drawback is that individual pricing (of gatekeeper access to the individual’s attention) puts the market
power in the hands of the individual consumer and underplays sender surplus. This eﬀect of personalized
pricing overly restricts message volume because the individual acts as a monopolist against the demand curve
for accessing her attention. She then overprices relative to the optimum.
To see this more formally, note that the social welfare associated to an individual with nuisance cost ω is
the same as in (4) except for subtracting an additional nω for the nuisance. The welfare derivative is then
20The Do-Not-Call opt-out may also change the proﬁle of messages received. For example, suppose messages are sent by a
producer with increasing returns to scale. This likely implies its equilibrium price decreases with volume. Then consumers who
opt out of receiving messages cause a higher price for those remaining consumers since less is produced. A decreasing returns
to scale technology has the opposite impact. It could also be that the consumers who exclude themselves have a more inelastic
demand (for example) and so price falls when they opt out. If so, the remaining consumers expect higher surplus and so end





















T h eb r a c k e t e dt e r m sa r es i m p l yt h ed e m a n dp r i c e( a b o v et h eb a s el e v e lγ) for sending messages for a marginal
sender type, and the net marginal cost to the receiver, all given that the receiver examines all messages.21
The individual receiver’s problem is to maximize




where the ﬁrst term represents the revenue from the personalized price. This price is the access demand




−γ, given that the cost γ is paid by the sender
for transmission. The individual therefore sets marginal cost, as given above for the social welfare problem,



















Since marginal revenue is below the demand price, the volume of messages is sub-optimal (as is standard
with monopoly pricing).
In summary, personalized pricing does not necessarily out-perform the Do-Not-Call list. Welfare on the
account of individuals who opt out is higher with pricing because mutually proﬁt a b l ed e a l sa r ee ﬀectively
struck with senders. Welfare on the account of those who do accept calls may be lower with pricing because
those individuals may excessively restrict access to enjoy monopoly access rents. That situation is to be
compared to the excessive volume of calls when those individuals are priced at zero (which induces excess
calls).
21The following argument shows the receiver does want to examine all messages for s0 (θ) ≤ 0. Suppose instead there were



















ns(θ)dθ − nω. The derivative of this expression with respect to ˆ θ (recalling this is

















− ω.A sl o n ga ss(.) is not increasing, the term in square
brackets is negative, as are all the others. Thus the individual will never tolerate congestion, and will price it out. However, if
s0 (θ) > 0, the receiver might price to encourage high θ types and not examine all messages.
22The individual wants to examine all messages sent ex-post as long as C0 (n) ≤ sav.
196 Pricing access
6.1 A monopoly gatekeeper
The open access market organization of earlier sections may arise spontaneously in the marketplace. An
alternative market system has an intermediary controlling the volume of messages transmitted through a
conduit. Then, the price of transmitting messages may be determined by pure proﬁt maximization concerns.
For example, there could be a proﬁt maximizing Broadcast Company, telephone company, Internet Service
Provider, or Post Oﬃce. This intermediary is the platform in a two-sided market, in the parlance of the
recent literature. The present context emphasizes the common property problem (and induced congestion)
of an open access system. Since access can be priced by a platform which will account for the common
property problem, pricing may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect of reducing congestion. But the intermediary is also
interested in the volume of messages since it takes its mark-up on the total number of messages sent. A
priori, it is unclear whether it will encourage mailings or just concentrate on the high willingness-to-pay
senders. We show below that the intermediary will fully price out congestion.
Assume that the receiver examines at most ¯ φ messages. This case arises when s(θ) is constant, so that
C0 ¡¯ φ
¢
=¯ s. Suppose that there were congestion, so the price a critical sender type ˆ θ is willing to pay to




/n,w h e r en = ˆ θ. With congestion, some mail is unexamined and











which is decreasing in ˆ θ.24 If there is congestion, the monopoly is in the inelastic part of its demand curve and
can therefore raise proﬁts by pricing higher. Hence, a monopolist would price out any congestion (assuming
23This is a gross over-simpliﬁcation. The cost structure is an important determinant of the Post Oﬃce’s pricing policy.
Costs and tariﬀs are lower in bulk mailings that group similar destinations and when the sender uses bar-codes. Non-proﬁt
organizations also beneﬁt from lower tariﬀs.
24If each message had a 50-50 chance of being read, a (risk-neutral) sender would pay twice as much to be read for sure. This
means that the monopoly could ration message delivery by half and keep revenues the same. It would save on costs and raise
proﬁts.




= p. Then the gatekeeper faces a simple monopoly












ˆ θ, which has a straightforward solution.25 The ﬁrst order
condition to this problem yields
−π
0(ˆ θ)
π(ˆ θ)−γ = 1





is log-concave (while the RHS is decreasing), so there is a unique solution. Hence the monopoly




(the message-examination constraint is slack),




(the constraint holds with equality).
We showed earlier that the (second-best) optimal choice of γ also involves pricing out any congestion.
Despite this similarity, the monopoly does not necessarily implement the optimum arrangement since it
tends to price too high. However, both monopolist and optimum may price at the kink in the REF, i.e.,
where congestion just ceases. Clearly, there are cases where either monopoly gatekeeper or open access
would be preferred in a binary comparison. The monopoly platform likely restricts access too much but the
common-property solution has too much access when it is congested (which is the interesting case).
The two-sided market literature usually considers access pricing for both sides of the market. In the
current setting, this might mean charging receivers for access too: an access price would extract all receiver
surplus. One insight from the two-sided market literature is that the platform may not want to charge for
access (even if it could): getting “on board” with suﬃcient gusto the side that is more desirable to the other
side may enable the platform to charge more for access. Thus it could be that the optimal price from the
monopoly intermediary could still be zero (or even a subsidy, just like “free” entertainment on the television
or radio could be seen as a subsidy to entice prospective customers to advertisers).
6.2 Comparison with personalized pricing
The monopoly platform disregards the nuisance costs to the receiver (except insofar as it must price out
congestion). The individual accounts for her personal costs (nuisance costs and examination costs, as well as
any expected receiver surplus) but then exacts a monopoly mark-up. This means that monopoly platform
pricing may or may not welfare dominate individual pricing.
25When s0 (θ) < 0, the receiver either examines all messages sent or else an amount that decreases in the number sent (see
Figure 4). Again the monopoly prices out congestion. Now a higher message price improves the receiver’s selection. Pricing
causes the receiver to examine more (and better) messages.













n, where the term in brackets is the mark-up. It sets
the corresponding marginal revenue to zero. The individual sets the same marginal revenue equal to personal




+ω. Whether there is more output under monopoly gatekeeper or personalized
pricing depends simply on the sign of this cost. If it is negative, personal pricing leads to a higher message
volume and is necessarily welfare superior to a monopoly gatekeeper. This outcome is more likely, ceteris
paribus, if ω is low.26 With higher ω, a positive marginal cost may result in a solution closer to the welfare
maximand (so that the monopoly gatekeeper is welfare superior). Even higher costs place the monopoly
gatekeeper solution with excessive message volume relative to the social optimum.27 The monopoly ignores
the receiver costs and so underprices (allows too much message volume) when these are high enough. With
large enough (disregarded) costs, the extent of underpricing may be so great as to render the personalized
price (overpricing) preferable again. The next Proposition is proved in the Appendix.





,w h e r enm = ˆ θm denotes the unique solution for message volume to the monopoly gatekeeper’s
problem. Then a monopoly gatekeeper generates higher social surplus than personalized pricing if nuisance













− C0 (nm),a n dω3 = π (0) − γ + s(0) − C0 (0).
Of course, there are distributional beneﬁts of personalized pricing, namely that the individual keeps
the revenue instead of the intermediary. Another issue that may favor the individual solution is that the
gatekeeper is one-size-ﬁts-all (i.e., the telephone company does not extensively oﬀer diﬀerent prices for
contacting diﬀerent individuals), while the personal solution is by construction individually tailored.
26Low ω are suggested by ﬁgures cited in Beard and Abernethy (2005) that most consumers were unwilling to pay nominal
fees for the State do-not-call plans that preceded the Federal one. Positive net costs are suggested by the large number of
subscribers to the Federal list.
27The gatekeeper solution can, fortuitously, coincide with the optimum. This happens if the gatekeeper price against the
sender demand curve equals the sum of transmission cost plus receiver marginal cost.
227C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has studied the economics of communication through unsolicited advertising. Receiver (consumer)
attention is a scarce resource, but may be considered as “common property” by senders (advertisers), and
so be over-utilized. Consumers also need to expend eﬀort to process and absorb the content of unsolicited
advertising. In determining how much eﬀort to exert, they consider only the average beneﬁtf r o mt h e
advertising sent (unlike standard markets in which the marginal agents on both sides determine the volume
of transactions), and they ignore the surplus created on the other side of the market. Performance might be
enhanced by restricting access to consumers by adjusting pricing or direct regulation.
One regulatory solution actually enacted is the DNC list for telemarketing. Despite widespread success, it
does not account for sender surplus. Other proposals (e.g. Ayres and Nalebuﬀ, 2003) would allow recipients
to set their own prices: an undergraduate might accept e-mail with a one-cent stamp; a busy chief economist
might demand three dollars. Personal pricing correlates access demand prices with nuisance, but gives all
the power to the recipient. This could be a desirable property if producer surplus carries a low weight in the
social welfare. Although it opens communication that is foreclosed when a recipient exercises her Do-Not-
Call right, it can be more distortionary than the eﬀective zero price under Do-Not-Call for those remaining
in. It is possible that a monopoly intermediary (which is the standard business model considered in the
two-sided markets literature) would price more eﬃciently than allowing individuals to choose access prices.
Although this market structure also has market power, it tends to under-price relative to individual choice
because it neglects nuisance costs to consumers. Only when these costs are either very large or small is
the individual pricing rule preferred on eﬃciency grounds. In its defence, it has more equitable distribution
(compared to AT&T getting all the proceeds!), and it is tailored.
Like email, people do not pay much attention to junk mail because the average message has too little
interest. Raising the postage rate on bulk mail may improve the allocation of resources through two sources.
People recognize only the better oﬀers will be sent, and therefore pay more attention. This mechanism
elicits better mail. This surprising possibility may raise more revenue for the Postal Service because ﬁrms
23are prepared to pay more to mail — more messages will be opened if they cost more to send (because sending
then signals it must be a worthwhile oﬀer). Interestingly, the January 2006 rise in US Post Oﬃce rates has
very high price increases for bulk mail (8.8 to 13.1 cents at the lowest rate versus 37 to 39 cents for ﬁrst
class), in concurrence with this analysis. However, although a rise in the transmission price will improve the
welfare of some receivers who are currently in a congested state, it reduces the welfare of others who get
fewer messages when they already desired more.
As well as the tendency of senders to congest the receiver, the other dimension of market failure is the
low receiver attention span. This can be more diﬃcult to remedy, and indeed impossible with just a tax on
messages. It is notable that monopoly power, either in the guise of the individual setting an access price or
an intermediary doing so, will price out congestion. The monopoly intermediary has the added possibility
(which we do not explore further here) of improving the allure of the message medium (more spending on
programming in TV, say).
Finally, we have assumed that each ad is sent by a ﬁrm producing a diﬀerent new good. However, most
junk mail is for credit cards, much spam concerns Viagra or mortgages, and many telemarketers call about
time-sharing. Suppose that all junk mail is from credit card companies and all credit cards are perfectly
homogeneous except for possibly their price.28 If consumers open messages randomly and there is a cost to
each additional message examined, then, as per the Diamond (1971) paradox, the only equilibrium is that
all ﬁrms set the monopoly price.29 Now though, ﬁrms will enter to dissipate all rents. Raising the message
transmission price necessarily raises welfare by decreasing the amount of rent dissipation of the monopoly
proﬁt. With a higher price, fewer messages are sent to vie for the ﬁxed proﬁt.
This suggests that the junk message problem may be a double common property resource problem when
there is competition within product classes. First there is over-ﬁshing for a consumer’s attention and second
there is over-ﬁshing in any product class (business stealing). The case for high postage rates on junk mail
28US households received just over 6 bn. credit card oﬀers in 2005 (http://core.synovate.comMAILVOL.asp). (The response
rate was 0.3%.)
29This analysis supposes that all credit cards are homogeneous. Introducing product heterogeneity tempers the extreme
results of the Diamond Paradox. Consumers will typically open several envelopes to ﬁnd a suitable product. This brings ﬁrms
into competition and brings equilibrium prices down (the original set-up has no competition because only one letter is opened).
The rent dissipation problem is muted because consumers typically choose the best of several oﬀers. However, as shown in
Anderson and Renault (1999), the number of ﬁrms is excessive, implying that an increase in the postage rate is optimal.
24(email) is the strongest when most consumers do not open all of their mail and there are high rents so that
there are many competing products within any class. What comes to mind is credit card ads through the
regular mail and Viagra through email.
There is though a caveat to this conclusion. When there are multiple senders within a product class and
multiple products, the logic of the Diamond paradox breaks down because a receiver may get a second (or
further) price quote while searching for other product class oﬀers. This breaks the monopoly price equilibrium
because consumers may then have several price quotes before choosing (as in Burdett and Judd, 1983,
although that paper considers a single product class). The consequent pricing and transmission/examination
equilibrium are left for future investigation.
8 APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Proof. The STF is given by π(n)
φ






1−n, which is an increasing and strictly convex function on [0,1). The average receiver
surplus is sav (n)=0for n ≤ 1/2,a n dsav (n)=1− 1
2n for n ≥ 1/2.S i n c eC0 (φ)=φ,t h eR E Fi sg i v e na s
φ
R =0for n ≤ 1/2,a n da sφ
R =0=1− 1
2n for n ≥ 1/2. This is a strictly concave function for n ∈ (0,1).
For γ/k > 1/8 these functions cross only once, at n = φ =0 .A t γ/k =1 /8 the functions are tangent at
n =2 /3.F o rγ/k < 1/8 there are two other solutions (in addition to the one at n = φ =0 ) and they involve









: φ<nfor both so they are both congested.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
Proof. Note ﬁrst that ω1 <ω 2 <ω 3: ω1 <ω 2 because π(nm) >γunder monopoly, and ω2 <ω 3 since
π(.) and s(.) are decreasing while C0 (.) is increasing.




=a r g m a x
n [π(n) − γ]n:t h e
solution is uniquely determined since π(θ) is log-concave, which implies the objective function is quasi-










25The solution to the personal pricing problem (given no congestion, which has been already shown) is













with ˆ θ = n. This problem is also quasi-concave,
with a solution that is continuous and decreasing in ω (and strictly decreasing as long as the solution is
positive).
The social welfare function, as long as there is no congestion, is W (n)=
R ˆ θ
0 π(θ)dθ −nγ −C (n)−nω +
R ˆ θ
















−C0 (nm),f o rs u c hv a l u e s ,t h e nnp >n m. Given the concavity of
W (.), it therefore suﬃces to show that
dW(np)
dn > 0 in order to prove that W (np) >W(nm).S i n c enp solves




=0 , the welfare derivative (6) reduces to
dW(np)
dn = −π0 (np)np,
which is positive, as desired.
For ω2 >ω>ω 1,t h e nnp <n m.S i n c eW (.) is concave, it suﬃces to show that
dW(nm)
dn > 0 in order to



















− C0 (nm), this is clearly positive, as desired.
For ω>ω 3, np =0<n m. The private pricing solution here is to price out all messages because




, but since ω>ω 3 =
π(0)−γ+s(0)−C0 (0), this derivative is negative at np =0 , and, by quasi-concavity of the beneﬁt function,
the solution is therefore zero. We therefore wish to show that
dW(0)
dn < 0 to prove that W (np) >W(nm)
by concavity of W (.). The derivative (6) is
dW(0)
dn = π(0) − γ − C0 (0) − ω + s(0), but this is negative, as
desired (and equals ω3 − ω), for ω3 <ω .Q . E . D .
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Figure 2. Receiver Examination Function Φ(n) when s(θ) is constant 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium with constant surplus   
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Figure 5. Equilibrium with decreasing surplus. 
                                           
              
         
                                               
       
       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 